Working paper
Equilibrium Effects of Quality Regulation of For-Profit Higher Education (Job Market Paper)
This paper studies the equilibrium effects of the Gainful Employment Rule (GER), the largest quality regulation policy in the U.S. higher education market. The rule required for-profit institutions to meet quality standards to retain access to their primary source of revenue: federal student aid. Using administrative data and an event-study design, I find that the GER increased for-profit exit rates by 5 percentage points, while surviving institutions reduced prices and enrollment by 4% and 20%, respectively. Untargeted competitors raised prices without enrollment losses, consistent with increased market power. Informed by these event-study estimates, I develop an equilibrium model of demand and supply with endogenous exit and a quality constraint to evaluate how counterfactual levels of regulatory stringency shape the distribution of value-added within an equity–efficiency framework. I show that tuning regulatory stringency can increase equity without reducing efficiency.
Work in Progress
Information Frictions and the Effectiveness of Need-Based Financial Aid: Evidence from Michigan’s Tuition Incentive Program (w. K. Ferrara-Gerson, K. Michelmore, N. Sotherland, K. Stange, and M. Thompson)
This paper examines the effects of a large need-based scholarship in Michigan, the Tuition Incentive Program (TIP). TIP covers in-district community college tuition and fees, can be stacked on top of most other financial aid sources (such as the Federal Pell Grant), bases eligibility on categorical participation in Medicaid, does not require annual certification of need, and communicates eligibility early in students’ academic career. Despite these advantageous features, participation in the program remains low. Using linked administrative data on 1.2 million Michigan high school graduates, we find null effects on enrollment with a regression discontinuity design but positive effects using a matching approach. These contrasting results suggest that students on different margins may vary in their awareness of the program. To reconcile these findings, we develop and estimate a structural model of college choice with endogenous aid take-up, in which students form beliefs about potential aid from noisy signals. Signal precision depends on individual- and school-level factors driving awareness, such as attachment to the safety net and presence of high school counselors. The model will permit us to simulate policies that improve awareness and reduce application barriers.
Online Education and Markups in U.S. Higher Education
This project examines how the rapid expansion of online education has reshaped market power, pricing, and markups in U.S. higher education. It asks whether the shift toward online delivery has increased markups by lowering costs, expanding geographic reach, and changing competition. The study builds a structural model linking cost structures, input use, and pricing to estimate markups across sectors. Using detailed IPEDS data on revenues, expenditures, staffing, capital, and instructional inputs, combined with information on online entry and enrollment, I measure how online adoption affects production and cost elasticities. Comparing pre- and post- online expansion periods, I quantify how online provision changes the relationship between marginal cost and price and whether these effects differ across institutional types. Counterfactual simulations explore how continued growth might influence tuition and profitability.
Pre-doctoral work
Educacion superior y subempleo profesional: ¿una creciente burbuja mundial? (with G. Yamada). Universidad del Pacifico, Working Paper Valor de la informacion en educacion superior y efecto de la calidad universitaria en remuneraciones en el Peru (with P. Lavado, G. Yamada). Peruvian Economics Association, Working Paper